

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 10, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Call of Mayor Willy Brandt

You have agreed to receive West Berlin Governing Mayor Willy Brandt at 3:00 p.m., Monday, March 13. He will be accompanied by German Charge'd'Affaires Franz Krapf and by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Foy D. Kohler.

I enclose briefing materials for your use in preparation for the visit. In addition, I should like to make two comments of a general nature. First, Brandt is not completely informed concerning all aspects of United States policies toward Germany and Berlin. This is particularly true of the details of planning for Allied reaction to Communist attempts to block access to Berlin (Berlin Contingency Planning). It would thus be well to keep the conversation on such matters as general as possible, stressing our determination to support West Berlin in any eventuality.

Second, Brandt is the Social Democratic candidate for Chancellor in this year's election, opposing Chancellor Adenauer. The Germans, Adenauer in particular, will be sensitive to any indication of United States support for Brandt which could be interpreted as backing for his candidacy. We should not for this reason diminish the warmth of our welcome. Brandt is most important to the Western cause in his capacity as Berlin Governing Mayor; he is a remarkably effective spokesman for Berlin as an outpost of freedom and he is a major element in Berliner morale, which is vital to our position there. We should, however, to the extent possible attempt to convey discreetly the public impression that it is in his capacity as Governing Mayor that we are receiving him.

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Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Briefing Memorandum.
2. Airgram No. G-333 from Berlin on Brandt's views.
3. Biographic sketch.
4. Tentative program for Brandt's visit.

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BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FOR VISIT OF MAYOR BRANDT

General Situation in Berlin

The situation in Berlin is, for the moment, relatively good. The most recent attempt of East Germany to encroach on Western rights—the requirement that West Germans entering East Berlin have East German passes—has been largely abandoned in practice. Western countermeasures were in part responsible, but the apparent Soviet desire to avoid a crisis in Berlin at this time undoubtedly also played an important role. As a result of this development the last element of Western countermeasure—a partial ban on issuance of Temporary Travel Documents to East Germans wishing to travel to the West—was removed March 6.

Brandt may make the point that further such encroachments are nevertheless to be expected and must be vigorously countered. He may be assured that we are aware of this and have every intention of reacting firmly.

Brandt may also mention the recent strike of airline flight engineers which for a few days halted Pan American Airways flights into Berlin. Pan American is the only United States carrier flying into West Berlin and one of only three airlines having regularly scheduled runs to the city (British European Airways and Air France being the others; Pan American carries more than half the total traffic, however).

The airlines constitute the only link to West Berlin which is entirely in western control, and the stoppage of these flights caused a certain amount of consternation in West Berlin as well as a degree of satisfaction in East Germany. Brandt may be assured that we are very much alive to the importance of air traffic to Berlin. There exist general plans for maintenance of this traffic and we are now attempting to work out arrangements to deal specifically with a situation similar to that which recently occurred.

Negotiations on Berlin and Germany

Brandt is known to feel that negotiations with the Soviets on Berlin should be held only in the context of negotiations on German reunification. He is also, like Germans generally, anxious lest we give away too much on Berlin in negotiating with the Soviets. It would be interesting to hear what he might say on the subject, and he can be assured that our firmness has not diminished and our basic approach to the question has not changed. (However, at Geneva in 1959 we did agree to discuss Berlin separately, and realistically considered we may be forced to do so again.) There is enclosed an airgram from Berlin which gives Brandt's views in somewhat more detail.

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Soviet Letter and Memorandum to Adenauer

Brandt may ask for our views on Khrushchev's letter of February 13 to Chancellor Adenauer and the memorandum which accompanied it. In them the Soviets pressed their well known positions on Berlin and Germany. In reply, the President may wish to say that the communications, in our view, are a move to build pressure for early progress, along Soviet lines, on the German and Berlin problems. At the same time, they are an attempt to engage the West Germans in bilateral talks and to drive a wedge between the Federal Republic and its Allies. It would be interesting to hear Brandt's views on this subject.

Brandt as Candidate

Elections are to be held in the Federal Republic in September for the legislature and Chancellorship. Brandt is the candidate of the opposition Social Democratic Party (SPD) for Chancellor. He has helped carry forward vigorously a modernization of the Party's platform which had been in process for some time. Standard Marxist doctrine has been almost entirely discarded and a more realistic view of foreign affairs has replaced the earlier neutralist tendencies of the Party. He is patterning his campaign consciously on the "New Frontier" appeal of the recent Democratic campaign in this country.

In the last national election, in 1957, the SPD received 9,490,726 votes or 31.8 percent of the total. Adenauer's combined Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) won 14,998,754 votes or 50.2 percent. Only two other parties obtained representation in the legislature due to the operation of the German election law which is designed to exclude splinter groups. These were the Free Democratic Party (FDP) with 2,304,846 votes or 7.7 percent, and the German Party (DP) with 1,006,350 votes or 3.4 percent. The CDU/CSU formed a coalition with these two parties, both more conservative than it is.

This year the SPD hopes to expand beyond the 29-32 percent which has seemed to be the limit of its drawing power in national elections and to prevent Adenauer's CDU/CSU from again obtaining a controlling majority. It might thus eventually come to power in a coalition, particularly should Adenauer disappear from the scene. All our early estimates indicate the SPD will not itself obtain a majority but can expect to prevent a CDU/CSU majority. Nevertheless, the latter party will almost certainly form a government again without the SPD, which will remain in the opposition.

In visiting the United States, Brandt undoubtedly has in mind the value of such a trip for his campaign. Since it is important that the United States Government give no indication of favoring either side in the election, we must keep this factor in mind in dealing with his visit.

INCOMING AIRGRAM

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Date Sent:
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Willy Brandt's Views on Berlin and Related Subjects

1. During past two years Brandt has adhered to his 4-point program re future negotiations on Berlin: (a) will of people must be respected; (b) position of Western Powers must not be weakened; (c) close ties with FedRep must be maintained; (d) free circulation within Berlin must continue. In amplification of last point Brandt has repeatedly stressed that Berlin sector boundaries must not become international frontiers.

2. Although he would prefer that any negotiations on Berlin be part of a larger framework of East-West discussions, Brandt realizes that West may be forced to talk about Berlin issue alone. He has pointed out that West's room for maneuver is very limited. Any future negotiations re Berlin must have as point of departure Agreements of 1944 and must not be concerned with new status for West Berlin but with entire area of Berlin. He believes that Western plan for reunification of Berlin as first step toward German reunification, which was submitted Geneva 1959, should be re-examined as possible basis for new Berlin discussions.

3. Brandt has repeatedly emphasized there must be no isolated solution of Berlin question, but that this matter can in the final analysis only be solved within context of solution of German problem. He has repudiated any solution on basis of Sov "Free City" proposal, but has stressed need for continuously probing Soviet intentions in order to discover any possible changes of Soviet views regarding ties to be maintained between proposed "Free City" and FedRep.

4. Brandt feels that status quo in Berlin must be preserved pending reunification of Germany because any change in legal basis of Allied presence would curtail "primary rights" of Western Powers in Berlin. Although he recognizes that Allied forces in Berlin have largely symbolic character --he likes to cite Khrushchev as having stated that Sovs do not consider these forces as constituting threat to their nation--he has repeatedly stated that Allied garrisons cannot be rapidly reduced below present strength

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5. Brandt believes Sovs may keep Berlin issue quiescent until after they have been able to feel out new American administration and possibly until after Bundestag elections. He thinks a successful conclusion of IZT negotiations last December and resulting absence of friction in Berlin's communications with FedRep were partially result of Sov desire to keep Berlin issue quiet and believes this hiatus should be utilized to explore through IZT channel whether "GDR" would be a willing go along with additional efforts to "normalize" situation in Berlin by solving "technical problems" (such as establishing telephone service between East and West Berlin) in exchange for certain economic inducements.

6. Basically Brandt favors gradual tightening of West Berlin-FedRep ties but since Genova Conference he has adopted principle that at very least what has been attained so far should be maintained. He has argued that it would be dangerous to abandon under Sov pressure symbols of Bonn-Berlin relations which have become traditional, such as annual Bundestag meeting in Berlin. Bonds between two free parts of Germany have been forged during past ten years with knowledge of three Western Powers and toleration of Sovs; it is legally impossible and politically dangerous to turn back clock.

7. Brandt has expressed conviction that fuller integration of Berlin with FedRep, such as might have been achieved through granting of voting rights to population of Berlin in federal elections or of full voting rights to Berlin deputies in Bundestag, would not have impaired Allied position in Berlin. Perhaps with an eye toward forthcoming elections, he has made point that Allied reluctance in this respect could have been overcome if FedGov had wished to permit such closer ties to develop.

8. In private conversation Brandt has made no bones about fact that ~~him~~ he considers as a serious departure from established policy FedRep's ~~recent~~ failure in negotiations with USSR for Consular and Commercial Agreements fully to take interests of Berlin into account. He is supported by most CDU members of Berlin Senat in contending that no agreement would have been preferable to agreements without Berlin clause. He has stressed that Bonn has an obligation, not an option or a claim, to represent Berlin in international sphere; neither Western Powers nor FedRep have any latitude to reduce FedGov's obligations in this respect.

9. Brandt feels that USSR is gaining ground in forcing something akin to free city status on West Berlin by refusing to accept Berlin clauses in treaties with FedRep. He shares fear expressed by Senator FedAffairs Klein that if and when FedRep establishes relations with a satellite country, latter will also object to Berlin clauses in its treaties with FedRep; possibility must also be taken into account that USSR may succeed in persuading friendly neutrals adopt same policy. Similar concern applies to non-recognition by USSR and its satellites of FedRep passports issued to West Berliners.

10. Brandt has stressed that FedRep's foreign policy course initiated under Adenauer cannot be abandoned but that new vigor and emphasis must be given to implementation Federal foreign policy. FedRep's position within Western Alliance and close friendship with U.S. must be maintained. He has regretted shadow cast on these relations

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by recent financial negotiations, and fact that American position was not clearly grasped by German public. As early as two years ago when he returned from world trip, Brandt stressed that FedRep must make much larger contribution toward aiding underdeveloped areas. He has also bemoaned fact that FedRep's posts abroad are not adequately equipped to compete with GDR Trade Missions which fully staffed as embassies and extremely active in political and cultural fields. He has urged greater initiative in combatting GDR efforts abroad and favors initiation of policies designed to embarrass the regime domestically by exploiting differences between ruling SED and population.

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